The First of three volumes (the second and third are also available on Amazon.com) that will introduce selected translations from the original four French volumes. This first volume has 11 course summaries that M. Foucault submitted to the College de France from 1970 to 1982. Moreover, Rabinow has skillfully included several key essays and interviews from M. Foucault's last years, when his work turned exclusively toward issues of ethics and the "care of the self." The outlines often explore subjectivity, but M. Foucault's thought turned more moral and political, zeroing in on technology and the social institutions. The selection starts with the difference M. Foucault made between the "will to knowledge" (a passion for authoritative organization) and the "will to truth" (concern for the integrity of subjective expression).

In exposing to us how these systems of knowledge are shaped by political structures of power (which in turn serve to justify themselves), M. Foucault provided dazzling critiques of some of our most highly regarded institutions in the areas of health, justice, government and education. This is really the first concrete anthology of M. Foucault's ethics of the care of the self and sexuality that really joins everything to his critical analysis of power/knowledge. In this volume, M. Foucault describes how philosophers, from antiquity to modernity, developed the practice of self-care through various literary modes: keeping journals of useful thoughts and quotations, exchanging correspondence of self-disclosure and advice between friends, writing texts of self-examination and confession (as if to imply that this was the forerunner of the modern day "examination of conscience"), drafting meditative and exploratory essay. Moreover, M. Foucault insists that "a pleasure must be something incredibly intense" or it is "nothing": "the real pleasure would be deep, so intense, so overwhelming that I couldn't survive it, I would die." Leaving no doubt why he is linked with such notables as Bataille, de Sade and Nietzsche. One of the more disturbing problematics that M. Foucault brings up in an interview is his thought points of resistance to power:

Q. It would seem that there is something of a deficiency in your problematic, namely, in the notion of resistance against power. Which presupposes a very active subject, very concerned with the care of itself and of others and, therefore, competent politically and philosophically.
M.F. This brings us back to the problem of what I mean by power. I scarcely use the word power, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for the expression I generally use: relations of power. But there are ready-made models: when one speaks of power, people immediately think of a political structure, a government, a dominant social class, the master and the slave, and so on. I am not thinking of this at all when I speak of relations of power. I mean that in human relationships, whether they involve verbal communication such as we are engaged in at this moment, or amorous, institutional, or economic relationships, power is always present: I mean a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other. So I am speaking of relations that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all.... These power relations are thus mobile, reversible, and unstable. It should also be noted that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were completely at the other's disposal and became his thing, there wouldn't be any relations of power. Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides. Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can truly be claimed that one side has "total power" over the other, a power can be exercised over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out the window, or of killing the other person.... Of course, states of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom.... But the claim that "you see power everywhere, thus there is no freedom" seems to me absolutely inadequate. The idea that power is a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to me. (291-293)
(quote abridged)

For M. Foucault, ethical self-care is formed by the system of knowledge and the power relations (as outlined above) in which the self is situated. The really expansive genealogical studies of M. Foucault's earlier books deal with how science related to disease, madness and criminality and how institutional powers sought to govern populations. Despite the almost about-face that M. Foucault makes, this book is helpful in making the change clear and how it fits within his oeuvre. M. Foucault's alternatives usefully problematize them; and problematization rather than conceited solutions is the hallmark of M. Foucault's philosophy. Rabinow's selection is a helpful one and no respectable M. Foucault selection should be without it, Volume 2 - Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, and Volume 3 - Power (all available on Amazon.com)

Miguel Llora

The acute awareness of the world and the role of the thinker in the world Foucault displays in this collection, especially in this volume, has inspired me. I see this collection as the personal side of Foucault, where the histories/archaeologies are of a slightly more academic tone. Berkeley's Rabinow, one of the leading MC scholars around, provides some great commentary and insight in his introduction.