Intro/Background:

Kripke opens up this work with something important to say: This book is the culmination of his first reading of Wittgenstein's P.I. and how "it struck to me". Therefore, Kripke doesn't hold any of these views anymore.

Summary:

In this book he acts like an attorney in a court room defending a possible interpretation of the "Wittgensteinian paradox". The paradox, briefly summed up, is the question of whether a past rule determines future usage in a new (set of) problem(s). Another sub-problem is whether the result of a function was the intention of the person who commands/uses the function.

The first essay deals with answering the constant questioning by a sceptic that Kripke thinks up. The essay goes down all sorts of various and different pathways. (Kripke takes and examines the "dispositional theory" of intention for example.)

Kripke ends somewhere in the second essay with claiming something like: A private language or privately followed rule (in a new way) cannot be followed individually because it has to be agreed upon in the community. Some of Kripke's argument against private language resides in ressurectioning David Hume's argument against a private causation.

The argument against individual intention contra another's intention rest on the resonance with the community again. If one person follows one rule, and another person follows some other rule, and if the answers differ, then the correct answer to problem will be the one that is agreed upon. (Kripke doesn't take up the argument against people that are following different rules but arrive at the same answer.)

That completes the first two essays. The postscript is interesting but tackles a different issue: The certainty of other minds being like ours. Again, Kripke examines the 'other minds' problem from Kripke's perceived view of Wittgenstein. The postscript is very short and doesn't come to any earth-shattering conclusions but is nevertheless a great thought exercise.

Conclusion/Personal Reaction:

Loved the book. It is a very unfavorable reading of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", but in some ways it is the best book on that work. It is incredibly thoughtful and raises important concerns for epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

I advise you to have the Wittgenstein's "P.I." next to you because often Kripke cites propositions that he doesn't quote.

Simply put, a must for any fan of Kripke's meager alotment of written work and a must for any fan of Wittgenstein.

Saul Kripke is legendary for his contributions to modal logic, philosophy of language and semantic conceptions of truth. He is, as someone once remarked, the Bobby Fisher of contemporary philosophy.

This is evident in this book. Kripke argues that the key to understanding Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' in his "Philosophical Investigations" is found in Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following which comes near the beginning of PI. Though this thesis has been critiqued for its apparent dissimilarity to some other views of Wittgenstein's, it is striking, original and intriguing nonetheless.

The radical skepticism inherent in (Kripke's understanding of) the Wittgensteinian paradox is astounding and will lead you to question the very basis of your belief system. Read this book if you're into Hume, Wittgenstein, Berkeley or Kripke--it is, unlike many philosophical works, very easy to understand.