Among the silliest of the many silly ways of criticizing something is to complain that it is not what it has no pretense of being. The title of Beiser's book, as well as its length and its rather hefty price, make it sufficiently clear that it is not intended as a general popular introduction to all German Idealism. Rather, it is scholarly inquiry into a phase of German Idealism that, while not altogether neglected, is too often regarded as merely a preparation for Hegel's triumphant system. That Beiser's study cuts off at 1801 relieves him of the need to deal with Hegel apart from his relation to Fichte and Schelling, and it no doubt reveals the bias of the reviewer from Cambridge that, seemingly having missed this point, he does not also accuse Beiser of neglecting to speak about Schelling's essay on the Human Freedom, his philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, Fichte's later systems, or perhaps even Solger's aesthetics, all of which also fall within the fold of German Idealism.
Granting the self-imposed temporal constraints of his inquiry, Beiser's aim is not to exclude or marginalize Hegel and deny his significance for German idealism, but rather to rescue the singular originality and grandeur of moments within the history of German Idealism that have fallen into the shadow of the leviathan to which they gave birth. While this very effort is somewhat compromised by Beiser's epistemological orientation, and I do not entirely agree with his ultimate reading of German Idealism as a neo-Platonism anticipating the Neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, I nevertheless admire the rigor and clarity of this work, and would strongly recommend to all those who have a more than dilettantish interest in German philosophy.
The review below which claims that Beiser says that Hegel is "tendentious" is not correct. Beiser's text reads, "Hegel's history of the period, which interprets it as a progression culminating in his own system, is tendentious philosophically, and anachronistic historically" (ix). This is certainly not the same as claiming that Hegel is tendentious. In addition, Beiser's criticism is quite correct; Hegel's history of philosophy is quite tendentious.
Another reviewer claims that Beiser omits Kant from this text. This is an absurd claim. The first section of the book, which spans 200 pages, is about Kant.