In this slim and wonderfully articulate book, Kellner makes a convincing case that Maimonides brought a radical new idea to Judaism: that Aristotelian "perfection" is the highest ideal of the Torah. To achieve this perfection, a Jew must have knowledge of the principles of Jewish faith, and not just any "knowledge," but a philosopher's knowledge, which in the context of medieval science, meant being able to prove each article of the faith axiomatically, working from foundational principles. Kellner argues that Maimonides' introduction of this notion of philosophical "faith" is an innovation, unprecedented in Jewish thought until that point. Like many of the Rambam's innovations, this notion was not universally accepted - and in the cases where it was accepted, it was not accepted in its entirety. Rather, what survived from Maiminides' elaborate architecture of idealism is the prosaic idea that Judaism espouses certain articles of faith, and that deviation from these articles makes one an apikoros, a heretic.

It is the notion of Judaism having a catechism -- a mandatory dogma -- that Kellner spends much of the book arguing against. If we could bracket out the Rambam's influence in this particular area, he suggests, we would have a more authentic Judaism, centered on Talmudic and Gaonic norms, which are more concerned with what one does than what one "believes." More importantly, a halachic, non-dogmatic Judaism could be a bigger tent, more inclusive than the highly factionalized Judaism of today.

It's a lovely idea, generous and humanistic, but it unfortunately founders quickly. Kellner stipulates that the Torah does teach certain normative beliefs, but in the classic rabbinic thinking, these beliefs are not mandatory (i.e. XYZ is true, but you don't have to agree that it is true in order to lay tefillin with me). But then he reverses to say that there are in fact some mandatory beliefs, and failing in these beliefs rightly puts one outside the camp. Examples are holding that the Torah did not come from God, polytheism or trinitarianism, or holding some non-Jewish notion of messianism (i.e. Christianity in Jewish clothing). And he does unlikely backflips to avoid any endorsement of "orthopraxy," behavioral Judaism stripped of theology. But the biggest iceberg in front of Kellner's book is that he argues that the Rambam's innovations are (A) a response to outside pressure, and (B) imported from Islamic Aristotelianism, and therefore they are not intrinsic to Judaism. This is an untenable view of historical Judaism. If we were to discount every development in Judaism that met the same criteria, nothing would be left. Instead, the truth is that Maimonides irrevocably changed Judaism, and there is no turning back the clock. Rather than wishing that the Rambam's marriage of Judaism and medieval philosophy could somehow be annulled, we should instead develop more fully the idea that understandings of Maimonides' thirteen principles are given to each generation to determine. Even accepting the Rambam, it is possible to be fully contemporary and yet a believing Jew.

The book gets five stars anyway, for being such a thoughtful and readable look at Maimonides. Right or wrong, it's still a wonderful book.

Kellner certainly knows the Rambam, however, I believe he is in generally a bit overborad in his conclusions as to how the Rambam has been adopted and why he thinks Orthodox Judaism needs to rethink heresy.

I think the issues he addresses with respect to pluralisim need to be addresssed and this book is very insightful in that regard.