This is without a doubt one of the best and most readable texts on the subject of the rise of Islamist movements in Egypt. It also works as a fitting sequel to Doanld Mitchell's groundbreaking volume - the only one of its kind ever translated into Arabic - on the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood written almost two decades earlier. The book describes the social, historical and economic context behind the Islamist movements neither resorting to apologetic arguments or righteous accusations. Kepel shows that Egyptian Islamist organizations have adopted a variety of approaches that are, more often than not, peaceful such as to effectively constitute what may be civil society in Egypt. Indeed, such organizations as the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt have recently shown that some compromise is possible with the representatives of the status-quo as well as with rival factions by participating in national elections, such as to avoid a civil war scenario. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt now opposes government policy from a legal and regulated official position but it faces pressure from more radical Islamist groups.
Nonetheless, intractable socio-economic problems have made it ever more difficult to contain unrest. The continuing reduction of the public sector since the late '70s and the failure to stimulate private economic enterprise has made it even harder for Egypt to sustain the precarious economic conditions that stimulate Islamist unrest. Although the Egypt achieved significant development in the '50s and '60s, it has pursued misguided economic policies that have fallen short of their potential. The benefits of the oil boom after 1973 and the Sadat-Mubarak economic liberalization policies that followed were mismanaged. Economic liberalization was primarily directed in the speculative construction and real estate sectors and failed to attract foreign investment in other labor intensive and professional areas. Unemployment persisted as the State reduced spending in conformance to IMF debt re-structuring that by 1986 brought about a gradual erosion of the human development achievements of the '50s and '70s. The series of economic reforms benefited the already wealthy. Islamist organizations have also gained popularity by absorbing the void left by the declining State.
Support and membership for such organizations has cut across class and income barriers and is representative of the frustration of a large portion of society, and youth in particular, with the current political establishment in Egypt. The government has not offered viable solutions to problems of unemployment, housing shortages, deteriorating municipal services or the poor quality of health care and education. Kepel also shows that Islamist organizations have solved problems that the government has been unable or unwilling to confront. Unlike government and private banks, the Islamic Brotherhood has operated Islamic Investment Companies (IIC) since the mid-'70s that have provided a real positive rate of interest. Ultimately, in view of chronic economic difficulties and the Government of Egypt's inability to adopt serious reform and tackle the problems of poverty and unemployment seriously makes Egypt very vulnerable to the zeal and violence of militant Islam.